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Abstract
We study the allocation of commodities through a two-stage hierar-
chy of competitive markets. Groups or countries trade at global prices
while individuals within a group trade at local prices. We identify the
free trade and the autarky equilibrium as polar cases. We show that
no other two-stage market equilibria exist if the commodity space is
two-dimensional. An example demonstrates that other, so-called in-
termediate equilibria exist for three-dimensional commodity spaces.
The example also exhibits endogenous price distortions in third coun-
tries when some countries follow distortionary trade policies. We give
two existence proofs for intermediate equilibria in higher dimensions.
Each proof provides an explicit construction of special classes of in-
termediate equilibria.
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Resources allocation mechanisms have often a hierarchical structure. The
simplest case is a two-stage mechanism where goods are ﬁrst allocated among
groups of agents and then allocated among the individuals in each group.
For instance, multi-member households may participate as entities in mar-
kets and decide on the distribution of the consumption bundles within the
household afterwards. The most prominent example is provided by interna-
tional trade where the groups are nations and the individuals are consumers
and producers. Individuals in a nation face a domestic price system. At the
same time, overall trade balances among nations are equalized at global price
systems which may diﬀer from the local prices, if signiﬁcant barriers to inter-
national trade exist in the form of tariﬀs and quantitative restrictions that
drive a wedge between local and global prices. Trade within and between
trading blocks such as the European Union and NAFTA constitutes another
example of a two-stage allocation scheme — with countries playing the role of
individuals (agents). Finally, many governmental (political, public) decision
processes follow a hierarchical pattern, distinguishing between “internal” and
“external” decisions, between local (regional) and global (central) levels as
well.1
The aim of this paper is to study in a general equilibrium framework
the simultaneous allocation of commodities through a two-stage hierarchy of
competitive markets. Members of a group of people (a household, nation,
etc.) trade within the group at an internal price system. However, internal
markets need not be cleared and the group can act as a trading block vis-` a-
vis the rest of the world. The group’s trade with the rest of the world occurs
through an external trade agency at an external price system. Balancing of
1For recent contributions on ﬁscal federalism, see Cassella and Frey (1992), Persson and
Tabellini (1996). Concerning international aﬀairs and negotiations, see Putnam (1988),
Haller and Holden (1997).
2the group’s external trade budget and market clearing across groups have to
be achieved at the external price system. Internal and external prices can
diﬀer since we assume that goods arbitrage across groups is limited.2 We
focus on the classical issues, such as equilibrium existence, Pareto eﬃciency
and the nature of ineﬃciencies in hierarchical market systems. Moreover, we
explore the relationship between trade in a single market and trade in hier-
archical market systems. We further provide an explanation for endogenous
price distortions.
We begin by devising a framework to study hierarchical market equilib-
ria where groups trade at the global price system while individuals within
a group trade at local price systems. Then we identify the free trade and
the autarky equilibrium as polar cases. As a rule, free trade yields eﬃcient
allocations of commodities whereas autarky leads to ineﬃcient allocations.
Therefore, the question arises if there is the possibility of an intermedi-
ate outcome that Pareto dominates an autarky equilibrium allocation, but
which itself is Pareto dominated by some other feasible allocation, though
not necessarily by an equilibrium allocation.3
In the main part of the paper, we aim for existence results for interme-
diate equilibria. A ﬁrst ﬁnding indicates that equilibria that are intermedi-
ate to free trade and autarky generally do not exist, even under standard
assumptions that guarantee competitive equilibria within each group of the
economy. We show that essentially no other market equilibria than free trade
and autarky exist if the commodity space is two-dimensional: The world is
divided into a free trade zone and an autarky zone. An example demon-
2Limitations to goods arbitrage can result from tariﬀ or non-tariﬀ barriers, transporta-
tion costs or through diﬀerences in market power across groups. See e.g. Verboven (1996)
for a recent study on why car prices diﬀer so much even between European countries and
Lutz (2004) for the speciﬁc role of arbitrage barriers in the car market.
3While the search for such equilibria motivates our inquiry, the “intermediate equilib-
ria” investigated in the sequel may not satisfy the suggested Pareto rankings.
3strates that intermediate equilibria exist for three-dimensional commodity
spaces. The example also introduces endogenous price distortions: Suppose
a proper subset of countries follow distortionary trade policies that drive a
wedge between local and world market prices. Then in two-stage market
equilibria, price distortions can arise in other countries as well. Hence ob-
served diﬀerences between local and global prices in one country may be
related to distortionary trade policies in other countries. In contrast, when
trade takes place in one market place, distortions deliberately introduced in
a subset of countries do not lead to price distortions in other countries. They
only aﬀect global market prices.
We go on to provide two existence proofs for intermediate equilibria in
higher dimensions. They also show how one can construct special classes of
intermediate equilibria. First, if the number of economic groups is at least
three and smaller than the number of goods traded, an intermediate equilib-
rium can be constructed by dividing the economy into two distinct exchange
economies. The existence proof can easily be extended to type economies.
Second, if the dimension of the commodity space is at least three and the
market demand of every group can be generated as the demand function of
its representative consumer, intermediate equilibria can be shown to exist
and can be constructed by restricting trade in a particular good within each
group.
Following the foregoing agenda, the paper is organized as follows. In the
next section, we relate the paper to the literature. In sections 3 and 4, we
introduce the formal framework. In particular, we deﬁne two-stage market
equilibria. Free trade and autarky are identiﬁed as the polar cases. In sec-
tion 5 we show that no intermediate equilibrium exists if the dimension of the
commodity space is two. In section 6, we analyze an example with three con-
sumers and three commodities with an explicitly calculated two-stage market
4equilibrium, which is intermediate in the sense that the allocation, though
ineﬃcient, Pareto dominates the initial endowment allocation (autarky in
this case). In section 7, we establish existence of intermediate equilibria by
using two diﬀerent methods of constructing intermediate equilibria. In sec-
tion 8, we discuss the relationship between trade in single and in dual market
places. Section 9 concludes.
2 Relation to the Literature
The paper is related to models of international trade with price distortions.
In these models, domestic consumers and producers in a nation face a set
of domestic prices. The domestic price vector diﬀers from the world prices
by a set of country speciﬁc trade taxes, levied on the net imports of the
tradeable commodities. It is well known from the theory of the second best
that elimination of part of the distortions need not improve welfare. A num-
ber of authors derive conditions under which a gradual multi-lateral reform
of tariﬀs would cause a Pareto improvement. Hatta and Fukushima (1979)
give conditions under which a proportional decrease of ad valorem tariﬀs in
all countries improves welfare in a world with two goods and two countries.
Fukushima and Kim (1989) and Turunen-Red and Woodland (1991) extend
the analysis to arbitrary numbers of goods and countries. Turunen-Red and
Woodland (1991) apply these results to various tariﬀ reform proposals such
as proportional reductions in tariﬀs and the reduction of the highest ad val-
orem tariﬀ rates. Yun (1995) shows that there is a unique continuous path
of allocations from a distortionary equilibrium to the optimum that can be
followed by proportional changes of price distortions.
In this paper, we develop a hierarchical model of international trade.
The trade literature assumes that all nations and their constituents trade in
a single market place, though each nation may face a diﬀerent price system
due to tariﬀs or subsidies. We view trade within and trade among groups
5as activities that take place in two diﬀerent market places. Consumers in
a group trade at local prices whereas the group’s trade with the rest of the
world occurs in a global market place and at a global price system. Each
individual faces a budget constraint when trading in the local market place.
In addition, the group faces a budget constraint when trading in the global
market place. We shall demonstrate that diﬀerent market places for global
and local trade and, consequently, double budget constraints play an impor-
tant role for equilibrium existence, the occurrence of price distortions and
welfare considerations.
A signiﬁcant body of empirical literature has shown that large diﬀerences
in the prices of tradeable goods, such as cars, are a persistent phenomenon
across countries and even within Europe [e.g. Flam (1992), Verboven (1996)].
In some of these cases, international price discrimination cannot be linked to
the existing tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ barriers [see Verboven (1996)]. Lutz (2004)
identiﬁes arbitrage barriers in the car market as a main reason why prices dif-
fer across countries. Arbitrage barriers can arise from transaction costs and
search costs. We show that some of the price diﬀerences can occur endoge-
nously. If in a two stage market setting certain countries follow distortionary
trade policies, such price distortions can spill over to other countries. There-
fore, internal prices may diﬀer from global prices even in countries where no
distortionary policies have been implemented. This is quite diﬀerent from
trade in one market place. There, distortions introduced by some countries
do not lead to price distortions in other countries.
It is well known from the study of allocation under uncertainty and the
comparison of complete versus incomplete markets that the diﬀerence be-
tween single and multiple budget constraints is a signiﬁcant one. In our
framework, markets are complete from an individual’s perspective in that
the individual can trade all commodities (assets). Markets are also com-
6plete, yet distorted, in inter-group trade. Considering the favorite setting of
conventional trade theory, a two-dimensional commodity space, we observe
a stark contrast between single and double budget constraints. Yun (1995)
obtains a continuous path from a distortionary equilibrium to the optimum.
We obtain a dichotomy, either autarky or free tree, and consequently the
absence of a continuous path between the two.
3 Two-Stage Market Allocations
We consider a model of a ﬁnite pure exchange economy where commodities,
consumer characteristics and allocations are standard. The distinguishing
feature of the model is the allocation mechanism, a two-stage hierarchy of
markets.
3.1 Commodities, Consumers, and Allocations
There exists a ﬁnite number ` ≥ 1 of commodities. Thus the commodity
space is I R
`. Each commodity is a private good.
There is a ﬁnite population of consumers or individuals, represented
by a set I. A generic consumer is denoted by i or j. Each consumer i ∈ I
has consumption set Xi = I R
`
+. The endowment of i is a commodity bundle
wi ∈ I R
`
++. For a given price system p ∈ I R
`, Bi(p) = {xi ∈ Xi|pxi ≤ pwi}
denotes i’s budget set. Individual i has continuous, convex and monotonic
preferences on Xi represented by a utility function Ui : Xi −→ I R.
An allocation of commodities assumes the form x = (xi)i∈I and belongs
to the allocation space X ≡
Q
j∈I Xj. In x ∈ X, the consumption bundle
xi ∈ Xi is assigned to individual i ∈ I.
73.2 Groups and Two-Stage Markets
The population I is partitioned into groups or nations, i.e. there exists a
partition P of I into non-empty subsets. P has generic elements h and con-
sists of H groups frequently labelled h = 1,...,H. For each group h ∈ P,
set Xh =
Q
i∈h Xi, the consumption set for group h. Xh has generic elements
xh = (xi)i∈h. If x ∈ X is a commodity allocation, then consumption for
group h is xh = (xi)i∈h, the restriction of x = (xi)i∈I to h. Thus group h
attains the group consumption xh ∈ Xh. We set wh ≡
P
i∈h wi, the social
endowment of group h.
Next we deﬁne two-stage market equilibria. The deﬁnition is based on the
given partition P of the consumer population I into groups.
Def.: A two-stage market equilibrium is a tuple (p;(qh)h∈P;x) such
that
(1) p ∈ I R
` is an external (global, world) price system;
(2) qh ∈ I R
` is an internal (local, domestic) price system for each h ∈ P;
(3) x is an allocation of commodities to consumers;
(4) xi ∈ argmax{Ui(yi)|yi ∈ Bi(qh)}
for each individual i ∈ I and household (group, country) h ∈ P with
i ∈ h;










The central idea is that individuals can only trade freely within their group
(household, country) h, taking the internal price system qh as given. This
8condition is formalized as (4). Under our assumptions on preferences, in-
dividual budget constraints are binding and Walras’ Law holds group by
group:





i∈h wi is the group’s aggregate excess demand. The
fact that individuals can only trade within their respective group does not
necessarily mean that the group’s internal market has to be cleared. Rather
the group h as a trading block can have a non-zero net trade zh with the rest
of the world. In external trade, the group takes the external price system
p as given and is subject to an external budget constraint. This condition
is reﬂected in (5). Finally, (6) is the formal expression of the global market
clearing condition. Conditions (5) and (6) imply for each group h balancing
of its external trade account:
(8) pzh = 0.
Note that the equilibrium allocation of a group has to satisfy two budget
constraints: the budget constraint with respect to the local prices that enter
the individual budgets, giving rise to (7), and a second budget constraint
with respect to global prices, giving rise to (8). This reﬂects our view of
trade in two diﬀerent market places.
From the perspective of traditional trade theory, our investigation can
be viewed as an exploration of the feasibility and consequences of balanced
trade combined with revenue-neutral tariﬀs cum subsidies in a two-stage mar-
ket environment. For suppose the government of country h imposes tariﬀs
cum subsidies reﬂecting the price diﬀerential qh − p. This gives rise to a
government revenue of (qh − p)zh. In a two-stage market equilibrium, each
country balances its external trade account, that is (8) holds and satisﬁes
Walras’ Law, that is (7) holds as well. Hence the tariﬀs cum subsidies are
revenue-neutral:
9(9) (qh − p)zh = 0.
Obviously, any two of the conditions (7) – (9) imply the third one. Next let
us discuss two conceivable deviations from these conditions.
(a) In theory and in practice, it is not necessarily the case that the bal-
anced trade condition (8) holds. A country may incur a trade deﬁcit, pzh > 0,
or a trade surplus, pzh < 0. If (7) still holds for each country, then the coun-
try’s government makes a gain (loss) of (qh − p)zh = −pzh equal to its trade
surplus (deﬁcit). To dispose of such gains and losses in a way that maintains
(7), the gainers might simply ﬁnance the losers’ trade deﬁcits. The interna-
tional credit market would be balanced, since by (6),
P
h zh = 0, and hence
P
h pzh = 0.
(b) Perhaps the most frequently made suggestion on the utilization of
government tariﬀ revenue is to distribute it in a lump-sum fashion among
the constituents of the country. More precisely, the government net tariﬀ rev-
enue will be channeled to consumers as lump-sum transfers or will be raised
by lump-sum taxes in the case of net subsidies. This, however, requires to
modify the individual budget constraints accordingly. Aggregate income of
the country’s consumers is augmented by (qh−p)zh so that qhzh = (qh−p)zh
or pzh = 0. This shows that the lump-sum tariﬀs or taxes lead to balanced
trade and a government revenue of qhzh in equilibrium. Our equilibrium
concept requires that qhzh = 0 whereas conventional trade theory (in what
we call a single market equilibrium) allows for qhzh 6= 0. In the sequel, we
shall treat the latter as our benchmark case. The exact relationship between
two-stage market equilibria and single market equilibria (one-stage market
equilibria) will be further delineated in Sections 6 and 8.4
4In Gersbach and Haller (2007), we extend the notion of two-stage equilibria to the
case qhzh 6= 0 (and pzh 6= 0) and we provide a formal deﬁnition of a one-stage market
equilibrium.
10In our model, a country satisﬁes both (7) and (8) in equilibrium. The
world economy operates under a system of tariﬀs cum subsidies that gives
rise to balanced trade. Countries could also be interpreted as a priori isolated
islands which each have their own domestic market. One can then ask what
would happen, if each island decided to participate in inter-island trade pro-
vided that this turned out to be revenue-neutral for the island government
and balanced the island’s external trade account. The result would be a
two-stage market equilibrium.
Our general assumptions guarantee the existence of Walrasian equilib-
ria for an economy. Assuming strictly positive endowments and monotonic,
convex, and continuous preferences for each individual consumer suﬃces.
Ensuring equilibrium existence facilitates the discussion of eﬃciency of two-
stage market equilibria. Moreover, the assumptions on preferences imply
that all individuals and groups exhaust their budgets and hence the budget
balancing conditions (7) and (8) hold.
4 Free Trade and Autarky
To begin with, we can state the following proposition for non-trivial P, i.e.
1 < |P| < |I|:
Proposition 1 For generic consumer characteristics, there are at least two
two-stage market equilibria, one of which is Pareto optimal and the other one
is not.
Proof:
For a proof, we construct a “free trade equilibrium” which is Pareto optimal
and an “autarky equilibrium” which is not Pareto optimal.
Free Trade Equilibrium: Under our standard assumptions, there exists a Wal-
rasian equilibrium (ˆ p; ˆ x) for the entire economy. Set ˆ qh = ˆ p for h ∈ P, and
11ˆ x = (ˆ xi)i∈I. Then (ˆ p;(ˆ qh)h∈P; ˆ x) is a two-stage market equilibrium and ˆ x is
a Pareto-optimal allocation. At such a “free trade equilibrium”, individual
consumers maximize their utility subject to external prices. Since ˆ xi ∈ Bi(ˆ p)
for each i ∈ I, each group h meets its budget constraint.
Autarky Equilibrium: Also under standard assumptions, there exists a Wal-
rasian equilibrium (q∗
h;x∗
h) for the sub-economy formed by the members of
any group h ∈ P. Now ﬁx a family (q∗
h;x∗
h),h ∈ P, of such “local” equilibria,
choose an arbitrary p∗ ∈ I R
` and set x∗ = (x∗
i)i∈I. Then (p∗;(q∗
h)h∈P;x∗) con-
stitutes a two-stage market equilibrium. More speciﬁcally, it is an “autarky








wi = 0 for all h ∈ P.
As a rule, the internal equilibrium price systems q∗
h, h ∈ P, are not collinear
and the equilibrium allocation x∗ is not Pareto-optimal.
The existence of these two particular equilibria establishes the claim of the
proposition. (q.e.d.)
5 The Two-Dimensional Case
After having established two distinguished types of equilibria — a free trade
equilibrium that is Pareto-optimal and an autarky equilibrium — an obvious
question is whether there is room for intermediate degrees of equilibrium in-
eﬃciencies and how their properties diﬀer from trade with price distortions
in a single market place. As will become clear, the existence and nature of
intermediate equilibria depends crucially on the dimension of the commod-
ity space. We ﬁrst examine exchange economies with two goods that are
reminiscent of most of the classical international trade models.
12Proposition 2 Suppose ` = 2. Then, at a two-stage market equilibrium
with p À 0, the world is divided into an autarkic trade zone and a free trade
zone. One of the zones may be empty.
Proof:




















(xi − wi) = p
X
i∈h





i∈h wi, then both qh and p are orthogonal to
P
i∈h(xi−wi) 6= 0;
hence they are collinear. But since p À 0 and qh > 0, this implies that the
two price systems are identical up to normalization. Therefore with prices




i∈h wi (autarky) or qh = p (free
trade) prevails for each country h. (q.e.d.)
Thus, with a two-dimensional commodity space, no intermediate equilib-
ria exist, except possibly equilibria that divide the world into an autarkic
and a free trade zone. This conclusion has been reached independently by
Bell (2003, p. 50f) who argues in terms of the government budget: “In the
two-good case considered here, which wholly conforms to the textbook case,
imposing a tariﬀ while denying the government the use of lump-sum transfers
[to achieve zero net revenue] can only be done if there are no transactions
to tax.” This is in sharp contrast to classical international trade theory,
where the existence of competitive equilibria is guaranteed under general
13conditions [see e.g. Dixit and Norman (1980)] even when signiﬁcant, but not
totally prohibitive, barriers to international trade exist in the form of tariﬀs
and non-tariﬀ restrictions.
The contrast between single and double budget constraints is further
accentuated by the existence and non-existence, respectively, of a continuous
path from autarky to free trade. Ideally, one would like to trace a continuous
path from an ineﬃcient, distorted equilibrium (e.g. autarky) to the optimal
free trade equilibrium, perhaps even continuously improving welfare along
the path. With single budget constraints, Yun (1995) shows that, indeed, a
unique path can be constructed, beginning at a distortion equilibrium, going
through proportional changes of price distortions, and ending at the targeted
optimum. With double budget constraints, the non-existence of intermediate
equilibria rules out any path between the two polar outcomes.
6 An Example
Before we establish the existence and nature of intermediate equilibria for
three- or higher-dimensional commodity spaces, we illustrate the concepts
with an example. The example will also illuminate the relationship be-
tween trading in a single market place and trading in two market places
and will exhibit the occurrence of endogenous price distortions. Suppose
` = 3, |I| = H = 3. Thus, each group contains exactly one individual. For
every individual i the utility function is given by















h), i = h = 1,2,3
14xk
h denotes the consumption of the k-th good by individual h. The endow-




The autarky solution leaves every individual with his endowments. Due to




































3 = 1. qk
h denotes the local price for good k in group h.




























































































15Let us choose q2
1 = 2,q3































2 = 2 is a solution of this reduced system. The































This allocation diﬀers from autarky and free trade. Thus, the allocation to-
gether with the global and local prices constitute an intermediate equilibrium.
Note that the third individual is better oﬀ in the intermediate equilibrium
than under free trade. However, the allocation in the intermediate equilib-
rium is not Pareto-eﬃcient. Individuals would like to trade again in one
market place, starting from the allocations they received in the intermediate
equilibrium.
The example can also be used to demonstrate the diﬀerences and sim-
ilarities between traditional trade theory in single market places and the
perspective of hierarchical trade in local and global market places. Let us










h can be positive or negative. In traditional trade theory, the price dis-
tortion is often related to the existence of tariﬀs, subsidies, quantitative re-
strictions, transportation costs, search costs, imperfect competition or non-
convertibility of currencies. Let us denote the distortion vector of country h
by τh = (τ1
h,τ2
h,τ3
h). τk = (τk
1,τk
2,τk
3) is the distortion vector of good k. In





















































Obviously, the intermediate equilibrium also deﬁnes an equilibrium in
which nations trade in one market place, while domestic consumers face the
domestic prices qk
h = pk(1 + τk
h).
We assume that the distortions represent tariﬀs and subsidies and the
government net tariﬀ revenue will be channeled to consumers as lump-sum
transfers or will be raised by lump-sum taxes in the case of net subsidies.
We claim that the intermediate equilibrium has a companion single market
equilibrium with the same distortions τk
h and the same allocations. This
follows from the following observations. At distortions τk
h and global prices pk
of the intermediate equilibrium domestic consumers choose an excess demand
equal to that in the intermediate equilibrium if lump-sum transfers were





















Therefore, at equilibrium distortions and global prices of the interme-
diate equilibrium, the government budget is balanced in the single market
equilibrium and thus lump-sum transfers are indeed zero which validates our
assertion. Obviously, the companion single-market equilibrium can be de-
rived directly by ﬁxing the price distortions and solving for the equilibrium
prices and allocations.
Intermediate equilibria require a budget constraint at global prices that
is absent from trade in one market place. While an intermediate equilibrium
has an associated single-market place equilibrium, the situation changes and
becomes more complex if we start with existing wedges between local and
global prices. In many cases, some of the distortions τk
h are given exoge-
nously, due to trade policy or trade frictions such as transportation costs.
As soon as certain distortions are introduced exogenously, trading in one
market place and trading in two market places may yield diﬀerent results
with respect to consumption allocation and prices as well as with respect to
distortions. Three cases can occur.
case 1: There does not exist a corresponding intermediate equilibrium.












The other countries face no distortions: τ2 = (0,0,0) and τ3 = (0,0,0). We
ﬁrst derive the equilibrium in the single market case. We denote the vector
of world prices by p0 = (1,p0
2,p0
3) where we have normalized prices so that
p0
1 = 1. We denote by LSTh the lump-sum individual h receives (or pays if
18LSTh < 0) in country h. The Marshallian demand functions for country 1




















Then, there exists a unique single market equilibrium with price system p0 =
(1, 3
5, 3





































Equilibrium lump-sum transfers are given by LST1 = 2















for any set of world market prices p0 = (1,p0
2,p0
3). From this observation
we can infer that there does not exist an intermediate market equilibrium if
the ﬁrst country imposes the distortions τ1 = (−1
2, 1
2, 1
2) even if we allow for
any suitable distortion vectors in the other countries. An intermediate equi-






h) is equal to zero which can never hold
since terms are positive as soon as we depart from autarky.
Thus, intermediate equilibria put constraints on the set of feasible dis-
tortions even for a single country. For an intermediate equilibrium to exist,
it must be possible that variations in world market prices lead to budget
19balance which, equivalently, requires that LSTh is equal to zero in the asso-
ciated single market equilibrium. One can easily show that in our example
no intermediate equilibrium exists if LSTh is diﬀerent from zero for at least
one country in the single market equilibrium. This is, however, a property
of Cobb-Douglas utility functions and of the endowment distribution in our
example where LSTh is either constant or a linear function of one world mar-
ket price.
case 2: A subset of countries introduces distortions an intermediate
equilibrium exists with the same distortions in these countries, but diﬀerent
distortions in other countries and a diﬀerent equilibrium allocation. Such
equilibria require distortions in those countries which have not introduced
them. Suppose e.g. that nations h = 1 and h = 2 introduce tariﬀs and
subsidies corresponding to the distortion vectors
τ1 = (0,−1/7,1/5),
τ2 = (1,−4/7,−19/25).
Consider trading in a single market place ﬁrst. Thus, the third country faces




1 = 1. A single market place equilibrium in the traditional sense treats all
distortions as exogenous, i.e. it imposes three constraints, the third given by
τ3 = (0,0,0). Again, the government net tariﬀ revenue will be channeled to
consumers as lump-sum transfers or will be raised by lump-sum taxes in the
case of net subsidies. In this particular case, lump-sum transfers are zero at













































3 yields a vector of world prices p0 = (1, 133
93 , 105
62 ) and the





































Let us consider trading in two market places next. Then τ3 is treated as
endogenous. The set of equilibrium prices has to fulﬁll equations (11)-(16).
(14)-(16) express the balancing of external trade accounts that is not required
in a single market equilibrium. Moreover, the relationship between local and
global prices is given by qk
h = (1 + τk
h)pk, k = 1,2,3;h = 1,2. We normalize
prices so that p1 = 1,q1
1 = 1,q2
2 = 1,q3
3 = 1. Solving for q1
3 (equation (11)),
q2





















It is the same as in the previous intermediate equilibrium. The allocations
coincide with the allocations in equations (21)-(23). Thus, the single market
place equilibrium has a companion intermediate equilibrium. But the equi-
librium allocations and the distortions diﬀer: The single-market place equi-
librium does not imply distortions in the country without an exogenously
21given distortion vector, whereas the intermediate equilibrium does.
The example illustrates a fundamental property of intermediate equilib-
ria: Suppose a proper subset of countries follow distortionary trade policies
that drive a wedge between local and world market prices. Then price dis-
tortions arise in other countries as well. In the example, local prices in the
third country deviate from global prices by an even larger margin than in the
countries that caused the distortions. Hence, observed diﬀerences between
local and global prices in one country may be caused by distortionary trade
policies in other countries. In contrast, when trade takes place in one mar-
ket place, distortions deliberately introduced in a subset of countries do not
lead to price distortions in other countries.5 They only aﬀect global market
prices. In sum, the organization of trade matters in the presence of exoge-
nous partial price distortions. If a subset of countries employs trade tariﬀs
or non-tariﬀ barriers to trade, the resulting equilibrium allocations depend
on whether trade takes place in one or two market places.
case 3: A single market equilibrium has an associated intermediate equi-
librium with the same distortions in all countries and the same allocation.
















where again τ3 = (0,0,0) in the third country. Therefore, the same single-
market equilibrium as before is realized.
5With a single budget constraint, “domestic distortions” in the sense of Anderson et
al. (1995), i.e. a wedge between domestic producer and consumer prices, will not spill over
to other countries either.
22Consider trading in two market places where the relationship between
local and global prices is again given by
q
k
h = (1 + τ
k
h)p
k, k = 1,2,3; h = 1,2
We normalize prices diﬀerently than before by setting p1 = 1,q1
1 = 1,q22 =
19
31,q1
3 = 1. Running through market clearing conditions and budget con-





























World market prices and distortions in all countries coincide with those in
the single market equilibrium. The allocation is the same as in the single
market equilibrium. Therefore, intermediate market equilibrium and single
market equilibrium coincide with respect to distortions, world market prices
and allocations.
7 Existence of Intermediate Equilibria
In this section we establish existence of intermediate equilibrium allocations
for three- or higher dimensional commodity spaces. The propositions also
demonstrate how one can construct special classes of intermediate equilibria.
In order to avoid pathological cases we assume throughout this section that
autarky and free trade diﬀer and that under free trade, each group has a non-
zero net trade and each individual attains a strictly positive consumption
bundle.
Proposition 3 Suppose ` ≥ 4 and 2 < H < `. Then an intermediate two-




i∈h xi(qh) for h ∈ P, qh ∈ I R
`
+ denote the aggregate demand
vector of group h at prices qh. Finally, denote the excess demand of group
h at prices qh by zh(qh) = xh(qh) − wh. Let us divide the set of groups P
into two non-empty subsets P 1 and P 2 (P = P 1 ∪ P 2). Consider two pure
exchange economies E1 and E2. In E1 (E2) consumers belong to groups in
P 1 (P 2), respectively. Take two corresponding equilibria with price vectors
p1 and p2 and allocations denoted by xP1 and xP2. Generically, p1 or p2
diﬀers from both autarky and full trade prices. Consider for each group h
the orthogonal complement of the equilibrium excess demand vector
c
⊥
h = {yh ∈ I R
`|yh · zh(p
1) = 0 if h ∈ P
1,yh · zh(p





h has dimension `−1 or dimension `. Consider the intersection
T
h c⊥
h taken over all groups h in P. This intersection has at least dimension 1
since we have at most `−1 orthogonal complements (as H < `) and one inter-
section operation reduces the dimension at most by one. Now take any vector
p 6= 0 in
T
h c⊥
h. We claim that (p;(qh = p1)h∈P1,(qh = p2)h∈P2;xP1,xP2) is a
two-stage market equilibrium. p1 and p2 generate local price systems for the
corresponding groups. Moreover, (xP1,xP2) is an allocation of commodities.






= 0. Since market clearing
prevails for both sub-economies P 1 and P 2, overall market clearing follows.
(q.e.d.)
Caveat: In general, the foregoing proof does not yield non-negative world
market prices! Since countries themselves do not optimize, negative prices do
not pose a problem per se, but — as a referee has noted — are counterfactual
in a model with monotone preferences.
Proposition 3 can easily be extended to type economies. A type economy
in our context is deﬁned as follows. Two groups are of the same type if their
excess demand function is identical. The most natural case occurs when
24both groups contain the same number of individuals and each individual
in one group has an identical counterpart with respect to endowments and
preferences in the other group. We obtain
Proposition 4 Suppose ` ≥ 3, and M types of groups with 2 ≤ M < `.
Then, generically, an intermediate two-stage equilibrium exists.
Proof:
We can apply the same construction as in Proposition 3 with one additional
consideration. When dividing the economy into two non-empty subsets, all
groups of the same type have to be put into one exchange economy. Then,
we have at most ` − 1 diﬀerent orthogonal complements of the equilibrium
consumption vector, since each group of the same type has the same equilib-
rium vector. Again, by considering the intersection of all complements, we
can ﬁnd the global prices. (q.e.d)
Proposition 5 Suppose ` > 2 and that all groups are singletons. Suppose
further for each i ∈ I, that interior consumption bundles are preferred to
exterior ones and that the utility function is concave and diﬀerentiable in the
interior of Xi. Then, generically, intermediate equilibria exist.
Proof: Here we identify individual i with group {i} and, accordingly,
label both individuals and groups by h = 1,...,H.
Consider the following exchange economy, denoted by E. Individual h is
allowed to trade except in one arbitrarily chosen commodity kh. Consider a




Then, qh is a supporting price system for group (individual) h at x∗
h À 0. We
claim that (p;(qh)h∈P;x∗) is an intermediate two-stage equilibrium. We ﬁrst
25observe that p and qh typically diﬀer. Since generically, each group has a non-
zero net trade under free trade, we can choose the commodity in which group
h is not allowed to trade in E, so that the excess demand x∗
h−ωh diﬀers from
that under free trade. Hence, the allocation under free trade is diﬀerent from
x∗. Clearly, x∗ is an allocation of commodities. Since ` > 2, and every group
is only restricted in trading of one commodity groups, as a rule, have non-
zero net trades with the rest of the world in the exchange economy E. Thus
the allocation x∗ also diﬀers from autarky. The incorporation of the non-
tradeable commodity into the budget constraint does not matter in E and,
therefore, we have p·z∗





In the next step we show that qhz∗
h = 0. Suppose that group h is not
allowed to trade in commodity kh ∈ {1,...,`} in the exchange economy E.
Because of x∗
h À 0 and the hypothesized properties of the utility functions,







k for k 6= kh.
Equation (30) characterizes the ﬁrst-order conditions for an interior compet-























The ﬁrst term is zero because group h did not trade in commodity kh. The
second term is zero since this represents the budget constraint of group h
in the exchange economy E. Finally, market clearing is guaranteed since all
groups participate in the exchange economy E. Thus (p,(qh)h∈P;x∗) is an
intermediate equilibrium, that is a two-stage market equilibrium with the
desired properties: no group enjoys (quasi-)free trade or autarky. (q.e.d)
26Notice that in the intermediate two-stage market equilibrium constructed
in the proof, all commodities are tradeable, despite the fact that the construc-
tion is based on an artiﬁcial economy E where every group cannot trade a
speciﬁc commodity kh.
In traditional international trade theory, the central results such as the
law of comparative advantage and Heckscher-Ohlin theorems are sensitive
to dimensionality and survive only as correlations or in an average sense in
higher dimensions. Existence of equilibria including distortions is, however,
not sensitive to dimensionality [see e.g. Ethier (1984)]. For trade in two
market places, dimensionality is decisive. We obtain non-trivial intermediate
equilibria only for three- or higher dimensional commodity spaces. Since ex-
tensive empirical work suggests that low dimensionality may be inadequate
(Leamer and Levinsohn 1995), we expect such intermediate equilibria to ex-
ist as a rule.
We have phrased the central existence theorem in terms of one-person
groups. However, the existence result can be extended to groups containing
an arbitrary number of consumers, as long as there exists a representative
consumer for each group such the aggregate demand function of each group
is generated by the demand function of its representative consumer. Then
we can apply the same arguments as above to establish the existence of
intermediate equilibria for groups with an arbitrary number of individuals.
278 Hierarchical Trade versus Trade in One Mar-
ket Place
Hierarchical trade diﬀers from traditional trade theory in terms of the or-
ganization of markets. However, as already suggested in the example, an
equivalence between the set of two-stage market equilibria and the set of
single-market equilibria exists in terms of distortions. Let us denote the price









Moreover, let τh be the price distortion vector of group h. Let (pn;(τh)h∈P;y)
denote a competitive equilibrium in which each nation trades in a single
market place, where y is the equilibrium allocation, pn is the world market
price vector and where group h faces the distortion vector τh and thus the
price vector pn(1 + τh). Then the following proposition holds:
Proposition 6 Suppose (p;(qh)h∈P;x) is a two-stage market equilibrium.
Then there is a single market equilibrium with distortions τh, pn = p, y = x,
and zero lump-sum transfers. Conversely, a single market equilibrium with
zero lump-sum transfers has a corresponding two-stage market equilibrium
with identical allocation and distortions.
The proof is obvious. As demonstrated by the example, the situation is
in general diﬀerent if we start with a single market equilibrium. Given a set
of price distortions for a proper subset of groups, there are three possible
cases. First, no corresponding two-stage-market equilibrium may exist. Sec-
ond, endogenous price distortions for the other groups may arise and thus the
allocation and distortions in the two-stage market equilibrium will diﬀer in
general from those in the one-stage market equilibrium. Third, when lump-
sum transfers are zero, there exists a two-stage market equilibrium with the
28same allocation and distortions as the single market equilibrium.
We ﬁnally note that the example has the minimum number of groups to
create endogenous prices distortions, i.e. such distortions can arise only if at
least three groups are present. In order to show this, suppose H = 2, with
groups h = 1,2. Let (pn;τ1,τ2;y) be a single-single market equilibrium with
distortions τ1 and τ2. Let q1 and q2 be the corresponding group price vectors.
If τ2 = (0,0), then q2 = pn and pn·(y2−ω2) = q2·z2(q2) = 0. Moreover, market
clearing implies z1(q1) = −z2(q2). Therefore, pn · (y1 − ω1) = pn · z1(q1) =
−pn · z2(q2) = 0. This shows that (pn;q1,q2;y) shares all the properties
of a two-stage market equilibrium. Hence with only two groups, trade in
one market and trade in two markets lead to the same equilibria without
distortionary spillovers.
9 Conclusion
We have developed a simple model of trade in diﬀerent market places that
can cause endogenous price distortions. Our ﬁndings suggest, among other
things, that trade liberalization in a proper subset of countries may aﬀect
the price distortions in the remaining countries. There is a number of fur-
ther issues that can be addressed within the current framework. Suppose
e.g. that diﬀerences between internal and global prices are bounded, but not
totally eroded by arbitrage. Then endogenous price distortions are limited
which may impede the existence of two-stage market equilibria.
There remain several interesting open questions. First, how many in-
termediate equilibria are there in general? Speciﬁcally, if the number of
commodities exceeds two, are there suﬃcient conditions for the existence of
a continuous path from autarky to free trade? Second, how is the analysis af-
fected by the incorporation of producers? Whereas the introduction of local
producers seems to cause mainly notational complications, the modeling of
29import-export enterprises and multinational corporations constitutes a much
more formidable challenge. Third, to what extent can the analysis be recast
in a monetary framework?6
Here we study the allocation of commodities through a two-stage hierar-
chy of competitive markets. Hierarchical allocation schemes with non-market
institutions at all levels have also been examined, e.g. in cooperative bargain-
ing theory. In that context, Harsanyi (1977) points out the “joint-bargaining
paradox” in the sequential application of the Nash bargaining solution. A
group (coalition) of players decides to bargain ﬁrst jointly for a big piece of
the pie and then to bargain internally about the division of the big piece. He
refers to the somewhat paradoxical phenomenon that “if two or more players
form a group and act as one bargaining unit, then this will tend to weaken
their bargaining position vis-` a-vis the remaining players.”
6For the prevalence and some consequences of limited arbitrage across monetary
economies see Hens (1997).
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